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Abstract
Privacy Sensitive Resource Access Monitoring For Android Systems
Leah Xinya Zhao
Supervising Professor: Shanchieh Jay Yang
Mobile devices, with an extensive array of capabilities and flexibility, are
sometimes said to be an extension of the human body. Enhancing device
capabilities and incorporating them into everyday life have always been a
huge focus of the mobile industry. In the area of mobile data collection,
existing works collect various types of user behavior data via mobile device
usage, and use the data to aid in further understanding of human behavior.
Typical data collection utilizes application or background service installed
on the mobile device with user permission to collect data such as accelerom-
eter, call logs, location, wifi transmission, etc. In this process, sensitive user
information is tracked through a data tainting process. Contrary to the ex-
isting works, this research aims at collecting application behavior instead of
user behavior. The goal is to provide a means to analyze how background
services access mobile resources, and potentially identify suspicious appli-
cations that access sensitive user information.
This investigation proposes an approach to track the access of mobile
resources in a real time and sequential way. Specifically, the approach in-
tegrates the concept of taint tracking. Each identified user privacy sensitive
resource is tagged and marked for tracking. The approach is composed of
three different components: collection mechanism, collection client, and
collection server. The collection mechanism resides in the Android OS to
detect any incoming activity to privacy sensitive mobile resources. When-
ever detection occurs, the collection client processes the formatted infor-
mation. The collection client then communicates with an external server to
store the gathered data. From these data, responsible applications, affected
v
resources, and transmitted data were identified along with sequences of ac-
tivity resulting from specific user actions. The result is a dynamic, real-time
resource for monitoring the process flow of applications. Statistical analysis
of sample data collected will be presented to demonstrate some interesting




Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivation and Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Problem Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 Analysis of Mobile Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Android Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2.1 Android Application Sandbox . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.3 Android Application Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.4 Data Collection Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.1 Overall System Design Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.1 Collection Module Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.1.2 Server Module Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 Data Collection Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.1 Data Collection Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2.2 Collection Client Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
vii
3.2.3 Collection Server Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Test Application Design and Implementation . . . . . . . . 31
4 Results and Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1 Experiment Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.1.1 Passive Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.1.2 Active Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.2 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.1 Privacy Sensitive Resource Utilization . . . . . . . . 43
4.2.2 Privacy Sensitive Resource Access Intensity . . . . . 49
4.2.3 Network Traffic Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2.4 Action Based Sequential Analysis . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
5 Conclusion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
viii
List of Tables
3.1 Location listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2 Contacts listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.3 Microphone listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.4 Device information listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.5 Camera listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.6 Accelerometer listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.7 SMS listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.8 Browser history listeners . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.9 Location based resourse test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.10 Contacts, browser resource, sms based resourse test . . . . . 33
3.11 Microphone based resource test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
3.12 Accelerometer based resource test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.13 Camera based resource test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.14 IMEI, IMSI, Phone number, and ICCID based resource test . 36
4.1 Categories and applications downloaded. . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.2 User interaction activity time breakdown. . . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3 Number of IP address for each application in the passive
and active case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.4 Applications with same IP addresses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
4.5 Performance measures of Panorama. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
ix
List of Figures
2.1 Interaction of students in the MIT community (figure ex-
tracted from Dong et al, [8]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 Android software stack (figure extracted from Android se-
curity overview, [1]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 AppWindow architecture structure (figure extracted from
Zhang at el,[11]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
2.4 NetSense mobile data aquisition infrastructure (figure ex-
tracted from Striegel at el,[6]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.5 mFingerprint mobile data collection to application frame-
work (figure extracted from Zhang at el,[14]). . . . . . . . . 13
3.1 Android security structure for user sensitive data access (fig-
ure extracted from [1]). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.2 Overall privacy sensitive resource monitoring system de-
sign. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.3 Overall data collection module design. . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.4 Overall data collection client module design. . . . . . . . . 27
3.5 Example TaintDroidNotify notification. . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.6 Overview of collection server module design and process
flow. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.7 MySQL database schema. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.8 SensorTrigger application display. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
x
4.1 Number of sensitive resource accesses made by each third-
party application passively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4.2 Number of sensitive resource accesses made by each third-
party application actively. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3 Number of sensitive resource accesses made by different
categories of third-party application passively. . . . . . . . 46
4.4 Number of sensitive resource accesses made by different
categories of third-party application actively. . . . . . . . . 47
4.5 Passive utilization of types of resources in terms of cate-
gories of third-party application processes. . . . . . . . . . 48
4.6 Passive utilization of types of resources in terms of cate-
gories of third-party application processes. . . . . . . . . . 48
4.7 Intensity heat map of passive resource access attempts. . . . 50
4.8 Intensity heat map of active resource access attempts. . . . 50
4.9 Intensity summary graph of passive resource access attempts.
52
4.10 Intensity summary graph of active resource access attempts. 52
4.11 Intensity of passive resource access attempts by application
categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.12 Intensity of active resource access attempts by application
categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.13 Intensity comparison between specific passive and active
application categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.14 Passive application network traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.15 Active application network traffic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.16 Passive application network traffic in terms of application
categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xi
4.17 Active application network traffic in terms of application
categories. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
4.18 Passive application network traffic in terms of utilized re-
sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
4.19 Active application network traffic in terms of utilized re-
sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.20 Passive action sequence of Google location process. . . . . 61
4.21 Active action sequence of Google location process. . . . . . 62
4.22 Action sequence of using Snapchat. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63




1.1 Motivation and Background
The smartphone industry is a fast growing industry. In 2013 alone, 1.004
billion smartphones were shipped, which is a 38.4 percent increase from
2012 [17]. Accordering to Gartner, a fact-based consulting service, 102 bil-
lion applications were downloaded globally in 2013 [24]. With this indus-
try growth, mobile datasets attract interest in many different fields: human
behavior analysis, business opportunity exploration, security monitoring,
healthcare, and many others. Especially with the fast advancing technology,
mobile devices are now capable of performing tasks of various degrees of
difficulty. Scenarios exist where applications embed user privacy informa-
tion collection mechanisms to better learn about all of its users around the
world. For researches, mobile data collection mechanism have also been
put in place to collect specific datasets for further analysis. The research-
based collections are usually explicit. Currently there are many different
types of datasets collected and analyzed in which mobile resources such as
contacts and sensors were used [20] [10] [28] [27] [26] [21] [18]. However,
there are few, if any, datasets collected to understand the dynamic behavior
of application processes and their interaction with privacy sensitive mobile
resources.
Privacy has always been a hot topic. However, in terms of technology
privacy, the rules and boundaries are not very defined. Particularly, on an
Android device, before installing the package, the application asks for user
permission to gain access to many of the phone resources. This is the only
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contract between the user and the application. Once the required permis-
sions have been granted, the application is able to perform tasks without the
user’s consent regarding to the granted permissions ever again. Many devel-
opers utilize this grey area regarding consent to gain understanding of their
target market behavior or even more. The Weather app, for example, has
a background service to actively utilize the GPS resource to track the user
location. Even when the Weather application is not in the foreground, this
GPS service will still log the user’s location. There is a need to understand
these background services behavior to help users understand risks involved
with each application.
Another reason to collect application process interaction with privacy
sensitive mobile resources is to understand the intensity and frequency of
resources accesses at any given period of time. Machine learning algorithms
could be applied to the dataset to learn the behavior of a specific phone and
observe anomalies in real time. In some other cases, this dataset could be
combined with mobile performance datasets to help phone developers better
understand each available mobile resources. The sequence of behavior can
also be analyzed in real time to identify security breaches. This is a small
step towards the cross platform big data challenge.
1.2 Problem Statement
Given the need and benefits of background services accessing mobile re-
sources, there are both security and privacy risks exposed. To address these
risks, datasets should be collected relating to activities of background ser-
vices accessing privacy sensitive mobile resources.
This thesis work proposes a dynamic real-time privacy sensitive mobile
resources monitoring system. The idea of data tainting is explored and in-
corporated into the overall system. The concept is that a flag is assigned
to each defined input, and then that flag propagates to all data derived from
that input. Another concept that is incorporated along with the tainting pro-
cess is the idea of active listeners. Active listeners are implemented in the
Android framework layer to monitor specific actions performed for specific
privacy sensitive resources.
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The scope of this work is sectioned into three major components: mon-
itoring mechanism, mobile client, and server storage. Each one of these
components will be further discussed in later sections. As with any research
work, there are some limitations. For one, the Android ROM must be mod-
ifiable to support the system wide collection mechanism implementation.
Second, with the stock Android ROM, there is a limitation on the kind of
third party applications availability.
The specific details of this thesis investigation are addressed through-
out the later chapters. Chapter Two addresses existing works in the fields
related to mobile data collection and analysis. Chapter Three is the method-
ology section, which addresses the design requirements as well as detailed
implementation of each component. The results and analysis of this thesis
investigation are presented in Chapter Four. Finally, an overall summary




The work involved in this thesis research is motivated by several related
areas pertaining to mobile data analysis, Android architecture, Android ap-
plication analysis, and mobile data collection mechanisms. The following
sections briefly describe each of these areas.
2.1 Analysis of Mobile Data
Mobile phones are capable of tracking human movements, monitoring ap-
plication usage, recording point of intersection, etc. Specific sets of mo-
bile data include social relationship data, communication data, GPS trajec-
tory data, application usage data, and sensor data. Human relationships and
community interaction are the focal point of many researchers. The under-
standing of social relationship and community behavior can help researchers
understand the spread of diseases, and crime outbreaks. This type of data
also offers valuable information for business marketers.
Dong et al. [8], from MIT have attempted to model the co-evolution of
behaviors and social relationships using mobile phone data. The research
was conducted on seventy residents of an undergraduate resident hall at
MIT. The data were collected through Windows Mobile devices. The data
collected were self-reported surveys that were designed by experts in po-
litical sciences and medicine, and proximity and location data that were
recorded from cell-phone sensors. Datasets from the survey included how
residents were socializing on Facebook, Twitter, and blogs. The datasets
from the sensors also included communication patterns that indicated who
5
called whom, and who sent short messages to whom. Figure 2.1 is a graph-
ical representation of the interaction of students in the MIT community.
Figure 2.1: Interaction of students in the MIT community (figure extracted from Dong et
al, [8]).
As shown in Figure 2.1 the different living sectors are represented with
different colors. The numbers corresponds to the year level of each student.
This also demonstrated that subjects in the dormitory formed clusters of
relationships by their dormitory sectors and their years in school [8].
On analysis related to communication data, Huhtala et al. [21] attempted
at modeling personal communication patterns by developing a mobile ap-
plication. Their approach was to collect logged calls, short message ser-
vice (SMS), and multimedia messaging serivce (MMS). After the data were
gathered, they categorized the data as positive and negative according to the
user’s actions with the incoming communication attempts. A communica-
tion was deemed negative if the incoming call was declined, not answered,
or did not reply to received message. The result was then put into a timeline
6
to display the positive and negative activity of the user. As of 2010, this
research was still an ongoing.
On GPS trajectory data, in the research paper Wei et al. [22], mobile was
used in the route inference framework. The interests were the movement
routes of humans, animals, hurricanes, and vehicles. The focus was the
location information along with a timestamp variable. The researchers anal-
ysis was based on check-in activities, photo uploads, and activity sharing:
basically anything that has a location and timestamp attribute associated
with it. This type of data has uncertainties associated with it due to the low
frequencies caused by certain application features and energy saving modes
[22]. The uncertainties were then used to construct popular routes without
knowing road network information.
Yuan et al. [16] is another case of utilizing GPS trajectory data. Specif-
ically, mobile GPS was used to determine human mobility models. Human
trajectories were determined based on cell-tower traces in a cellular net-
work, trajectory driving routes, or posts that consists of geo tweets and geo-
tagged photos, as well as check-ins. This type of data was determined to
have a strong correlation with the traveling behavior of people [16]. The re-
searchers used this dataset to determine when people arrived at and left from
a specific region. The data points were also used to determine where people
were coming from and going to. This dataset was then combined with POIs
to model the urban dynamics. Specifically, the topic-based method was used
to analyze the data. For example, the geographic regions are seen as docu-
ments. The functions that are associated with each region are seen as topics.
The human mobility gathered from mobile data is seen as words. Lastly, the
POIs located in each region are seen as metadata [16]. This model was put
in place to analyze the urban dynamics in Beijing.
For application usage data, in the research paper Shi et al. [18], mobile
data were used to enhance the recommendation algorithms that Google Play
and Netflix have been using for ages. GetJar is a mobile application based
company. They provide applications to users of all platforms. GetJar takes
advantage of the application usage data collected on mobile phones to make
recommendations to users. Depending on the recent application usage of
a personal user, GetJar personalized the application recommendation based
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on that [18].
Aside from all the datasets discussed, there are also sensor datasets. Mo-
bile devices are equipped with several advanced sensors to enhance the user
experience. In the area of data collection, these sensors could be easily ac-
cessed and used to collect valuable information about the user. Kwapisz et
al [20], explored the potential of using a cell phone accelerometer to detect
the type of activity that the user had performed. In this particular approach
they utilized the fact that accelerometers can track movement in the X, Y,
and Z axes. The data were collected directly from files stored on the phones
via a USB connection. The collected accelerometer values were then trans-
lated to useful data sets. The data sets contained information such as average
acceleration for each axis, standard deviation for each axis, average absolute
difference for each axis, average resultant acceleration, time between peaks
of each axis, and range of value in each axis. The collected data were then
plotted. By analyzing the different patterns and frequencies of various ac-
tivities, it was then quickly realized which activity the user was performing
at that time.
This body of related work demonstrates some of the many possible uses
for collected mobile data. These types of analysis are based on explicit data
collection through some sort of human interaction, whether it is mindful
interaction or oblivious interaction. The work discussed very much focused
on human mobility analysis. However, there is another side of analysis that
has not been explored very much. This thesis work focuses on the implicit
data collection (data collection that are completed without user awareness)
and analysis of background services data. Specifically, the work concerns
access and activity frequencies to privacy sensitive resources on the phone.
This specific set of data may help researchers understand potential security
loopholes as well as to better understand specific application.
2.2 Android Architecture
Android is a very popular modern open mobile platform. In just the third
quarter of 2013, 81.3 percent of the smartphones shipped were based on
the Android operating system [13]. This open source platform is composed
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of three building blocks: device hardware, Android operating system, and
Android application runtime [1]. The device hardware contains the hard-
ware configurations to target specific devices such as smart phones, tablets,
etc. The Android operating system is responsible for managing all device
resources as camera, GPS, Bluetooth, telephony function, network connec-
tions, etc. Lastly, the Android application runtime is the environment in
which both Dalvik and native applications run.
In terms of software, Android has a very defined architecture. In Figure
2.2, each layer and its responsibilities of the software stack are displayed.
Figure 2.2: Android software stack (figure extracted from Android security overview, [1]).
The idea of the software stack is that each component assumes that the
components below are properly secured. The Linux security layer provides
user-based permission model, process isolation, extensible mechanism for
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secure inter-process communication (IPC), and the ability to remove unnec-
essary and potentially insecure parts of the kernel. In this thesis investiga-
tion, the application framework layer, libraries layer, and android runtime
layer are modified to support the collection mechanism.
2.2.1 Android Application Sandbox
Application sandbox is based on the Linux user-based protection concept.
In general terms, it is the idea of identifying and isolating application re-
sources [1]. A unique user ID (UID) is assigned to each Android application
by the Android system. Each application then runs as that user in a separate
process. This prevents applications from interacting with each other by de-
fault, and it also limits the access to the operating system. The application
sandbox resides in the kernel layer; this architecture allows software above
the kernel as shown in Figure 2.2 to comply with the security limitations.
This application sandbox architecture makes collection mechanism im-
plementation impossible in the application layer as seen in Figure 2.2. Since
the focus of the collection mechanism is to monitor the accesses of third-
party applications to privacy sensitive resources, modification to the An-
droid software stack was necessary to support the level of Android security
breach.
2.3 Android Application Analysis
In terms of Android application analysis, there has been little work. Enck
et al. [27], addressed the weaknesses of smartphone operating systems in
terms of giving users adequate control over and visibility into how third-
party applications use their private data. The approach that was taken was
to create a customized ROM to allow tracking of the user sensitive informa-
tion as it traverses through the phone and eventually leaves. The major con-
cept that was exposed was the idea of labeling data from privacy-sensitive
sources and transitively applying labels as sensitive data propagates through
program variables, files, and inter-process messages. This research was very
successful. It was tested on 30 popular third-party Android applications and
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Figure 2.3: AppWindow architecture structure (figure extracted from Zhang at el,[11]).
68 cases of potential misuse of users’ private information was found across
20 applications.
Wei et al. [12] is another research effor to assess and monitor applica-
tions in a systematic way. This research attempted to construct a profile for
various third-party applications. The main approach is divided into four dif-
ferent layers: static specification, user interactions, operating system, and
network. In the static layer, the APK (Android application package) was
analyzed. In the user interaction layer, user generated events were recorded
and logged with tools such as adb and logcat. For the operating system
layer, system calls were monitored to observe operating system activity.
In the network layer, network traffic was analyzed through the logging of
data packets. In total, 27 free and paid Android applications were evalu-
ated. Discrepancies between the application specification and application
execution were found. Many cost-effective but comprehensive application
profiles were formed.
For improving transparency for smartphone applications, Zhang et al
[11], has created a tool to assess privacy risks involved with mobile ap-
plications. The team developed a framework to qualitatively assess and
quantitatively measure the intrusiveness of smartphone applications. The
11
assessment was conducted based on the access behaviors of applications.
Their overall system was divided into two parts: Privacy Fingerprint and In-
trusiveness Score. The AppWindow developed for the Privacy Fingerprint
component is shown in Figure 2.3. The basic idea was that the methods
of each accessed sensitive information methods are monitored. Whenever
specific methods are called, the event is logged. Intrusive scores algorithms
are then applied to understand the risks involved.
This thesis work contributes to application analysis. It incorporates and
extends the work done with TaintDroid [27]. The enhancements lie in the
addition of privacy sensitive resource action listeners. These listeners aug-
ment the sensitive resource access dataset by providing sequential access
and specific actions.
2.4 Data Collection Mechanisms
For collecting information on a mobile device, there are many approaches.
In their research paper Striegel et al. [6], the question how the digital world
(Facebook, SMS, etc) impacts how friends are made and kept was explored.
A NetSense Infrastructure built to extract useful information from the mo-
bile device and pass it on for storage on an external server. The overall
structure is displayed in Figure 2.4.
The structure was very logical. There were essentially two components:
data gathering agent and database server. The data gathering agent was a
pre-installed application on each of the Nokia phone for experimentation.
The pre-installed agent was executed at the user level. The types of data
that were collected by the agent were application usage, device usage, lo-
cation, communication, proximity of other users, device state, and network
environments information. Since the collection was not event triggered, the
frequency of collection was based on a periodic basis ranging from hourly
to daily. Once the data were collected, they were first temporarily stored
in a local SQLite database on the mobile device. After, the data were then
sent to the two check-in servers. The purpose of the check-in servers was to
provide fault tolerance in the event of failure [6]. After the check-in servers,
the data were then parsed and stored in a relational database.
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Figure 2.4: NetSense mobile data aquisition infrastructure (figure extracted from Striegel
at el,[6]).
In Zhang et al. [14], a user modeling framework was developed from
a multimodal mobile sensor and log data. The framework that was built
covered the whole process from collecting, to processing, to analyzing, and
applying data. mFingerpring framework is displayed in Figure 2.5
The framework was clearly defined in four layers. The very first layer is
the mobile data collection layer. In this layer, an Android app called Easy-
Track was developed based on Funf Open Sensing Framework. The app
collected hard sensor data as well as application log data. The collected in-
formation was then passed to the feature computation layer. In this layer,
the entropy and frequency features were then conditioned based on time and
location. After, data mining techniques such as clustering and classification
were carried out in the user learning layer to further massage the data. The
learned insights were then applied in the application layer in areas of user
profile/behavior logger, reminder and user identification, and personaliza-
tion services/UI.
The related works presented very logical process and structure from col-
lecting to storing mobile data. The two component approach is very mod-
ular and energy efficient. This thesis work follows very much of a same
13
Figure 2.5: mFingerprint mobile data collection to application framework (figure extracted
from Zhang at el,[14]).
structure. There is a collection agent pre-installed on the phone to monitor
the communication between Android background services and sensitive re-
sources. This agent is based on the customized ROM developed through the
study done by Enck et al. [27]. The database storing the information is also
externalized on a server. However, this thesis work introduces a third com-
ponent: the collection client. The collection client is also pre-installed on
the phone. This client handles the communication between the database and
the collection agent. By adding the collection client, it reduces any bottle-





The lack of understanding of application and sensitive resource communica-
tion presents a need to collect dynamic and timestamp based data on third-
party applications’ access to various available privacy sensitive resources.
To approach this system wide sensitive resource monitoring system, a dy-
namic, sequence-based system must be implemented to track the various
sensitive resources and store the resulting data. To design a dynamic real
time privacy sensitive resources monitoring system there are many things to
consider.
1. System must be able to listen to the communication between avail-
able privacy sensitive resources and other third-party applications.
2. System must be able to track the flow of sensitive resources data.
3. The collection must run passively in the background to prevent
interference with current running applications.
4. The collected data must be stored in a scalable database to support
future expansion.
The later sections of this chapter cover how each of these requirements
was satisfied. First, an overall system design analysis discussed to assess the
pros and cons of each design concept. Secondly, a high level overall view
of the chosen design explained. After, each module of the overall system
design discussed in details.
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3.1 Overall System Design Analysis
In order to accomplish these tasks, a dynamic system wide time based sen-
sitive resource tracking system implemented. The design consideration was
divided into two major focuses: the collection module and the server mod-
ule.
3.1.1 Collection Module Analysis
The collection module is the most important and crucial consideration of
this thesis investigation. For the collection module design, the main require-
ment is that the module must be able to observe and record the communica-
tions of privacy sensitive resources. At a first glance, the very logical way of
tracking system wide communication between third-party applications and
sensitive resources was to design an application to monitor the processes of
other applications. This type of design calls for application process and re-
source monitoring. With the current Android sandbox security architecture,
this type of activity was marked as a type of security breach. Figure 3.1
displays the Android security structure for user sensitive data access.
Figure 3.1: Android security structure for user sensitive data access (figure extracted from
[1]).
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The idea of the sandbox architecture is to isolate each application pro-
cesses from the other to ensure that there is no memory, CPU, and device
(e.g. telephony, GPS, Bluetooth) hogging [1]. The sandbox structure also
protects one applications private data from the others. Due to this security
structure, a third-party sensitive resources monitoring application was not
feasible.
Another examined approach was to utilize the Android debug bridge
(ADB) and the Android logging system. The Android system supports a
system wide logging facility. This facility allows for the logging of appli-
cations and system components. The logging system consists of a kernel
driver and buffer for storing log messages, language classes for making and
accessing log messages, a standalone program for viewing log messages
(logcat), and it has the ability to filter log messages from the host machine
(via Eclipse or DDMS) [2]. The system also supports four different log
buffers to enable logging for different parts of the Android system. The
four log buffers are: main, events, radio, and system [2]. The main buffer is
responsible for main application logging. The events buffer is used to track
system even information. The radio buffer is used to log radio and phone
based activities. Finally, the system buffer is used to log low-level system
and debug messages.
After some analysis, it was realized that this logging system is only use-
ful to a certain extend. For the logs to contain communication data between
third-party applications and sensitive resources, third party applications had
to implement log triggers to log those messages. This required a modifi-
cation to all of the third-party applications’ source code. Aside from the
modification, the already logged messages are also not in a standard for-
mat. The message part of the log contained whatever the user or system
wanted, thus made analyzing the collected dataset extreme difficult. With
these two limitations, the logging design of the collection module would be
impractical.
The final collection module design that was analyzed was the idea of
taint tracking, which was successfully demonstrated in the TaintDroid re-
search [27]. The idea was to modify the ROM to enable tagging of privacy
sensitive resources. The tagging allows the tracking of sensitive data flow
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throughout the device to when the sensitive information leaves the phone.
This concept was successful in tracking when changes were made to the
sensitive data source as well as when sensitive information left the phone.
This type of tracking lacked details in specific actions performed by each
application processes. For example, all the internal details of actions per-
formed before the information left the phone were ignored. This limitation
required the implementation of listeners to track specific internal sensitive
resource activities. The design is a system of taint tracking combined with
privacy sensitive resource listeners. This provides a more comprehensive
and sequence based sensitive resources communication dataset.
3.1.2 Server Module Analysis
The purpose of the server module is to handle the collected data in an effi-
cient way that could make future analysis easier. For the scope of this thesis
investigation, the server module had to be able to parse data strings and
store them in a database. The communication method between the client
and the server was hypertext transfer protocol (HTTP). This protocol sup-
ports two different request methods: GET and POST. The GET method is a
simple and insecure way of requesting data from specified resources. GET
requests can be cached and bookmarked, and they have length restriction.
On the contrary, the POST request is never cached, does not remain in the
browser history, and has no data length restrictions. Due to the sensitivity
and variable length of the data being collected, the HTTP POST request
method was chosen for communication between the client and server mod-
ule. As for the database, MySQL database was chosen. Since the communi-
cation data between third-party applications and sensitive resources are all
very standard and structured, the MySQL database satisfied the need. The
structured MySQL database allowed to easy data analysis as well.
3.2 Data Collection Components
The purpose of this overall system design is to enable the tracking of actions
taken by third-party applications that are related to sensitive resources. As
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described in the overall system design analysis section, many design con-
cepts were viewed and evaluated against system requirements.
To satisfy the requirements mentioned previously, the overall system is
composed of three components: data collection module, collection client
module, and collection server module. Figure 3.2, is a high level overview
of the overall system components and process flow.
Figure 3.2: Overall privacy sensitive resource monitoring system design.
The design is based on the Android operating system. As seen in Fig-
ure 3.2, the design is divided into two major implementations: the Android
smart phone implementation and the server side implementation. The An-
droid smart phone implementation is then further divided into two differ-
ent modules: the data collection module and the collection client module.
Further division is based on the Android architecture structure and process
flow. The data collection module resides throughout application framework,
libraries, and Android runtime layer as could be observed in Figure 2.2. The
collection client module is implemented as an Android application and re-
sides in the application layer.
The data collection module is designed based on the TaintDroid system
[27]. The module utilizes the idea of tainting the data to track sensitive in-
formation flow. The TaintDroid tainting component is run in parallel with
active sensitive resources listeners to track resource specific actions. The
combined structure allows the system to listen to communication between
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available sensitive resources and other third-party applications. The incor-
poration of TaintDroid also allows the system to tag sensitive resources and
track the flow of data from them throughout the system. Since the sensi-
tive resources listeners are placed in the application framework layer, this
enables the collection to run passively in the background to prevent interfer-
ence with other running applications.
The collection client module is also designed based on the TaintDroid-
Notify application [27] with the addition of client and server communica-
tion support. The client module defines the dataset structure and prepares
the data to be sent to an external server. The communication between client
and server is established by the collection client support component as seen
in Figure 3.2. The communication protocol that is used is HTTP POST re-
quest. Since the application spawnned Android services to actively collect
and send information, the collection process was able to run passively in the
background.
On the sever side implementation, the design was a simple one. The
goal was to securely receive the data and establish an interface between
the server application layer and the implemented MySQL database. The
client module is composed of three components as described in Figure 3.2.
The components are web layer, application layer, and MySQL relational
database. The web layer handles incoming server communication. The
application layer is responsible for establish database connection. Finally,
the database is used to house all the incoming data. This structure allows for
secure data transfer and storage due to the security check in the application
layer. This structure could be copied and more databases could be added to
support future expansion.
The process flow of the overall system can be observed in Figure 3.2.
The process is resources access event driven. The resource action listeners
actively records sensetive resource based events. These events are tagged
with the TaintDroid tagging system [27]. The events are then passed on to
the client module for data formatting and preparing for send off. The events
are formatted in key value pairs. Then, the collection client support com-
ponent establishes a secure connection with the server module, and sends
the event through HTTP POST request. The request first hits the web layer,
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then it passes to the application layer. In the application layer, the data is
further formatted to meet the database schema. Once the application layer
establishes a secure connection, the event is then injected into the database.
Users can then observe the results in the database.
The later subsections describe each module implementation in detail.
The data collection module is discussed first, and then the client module.
Finally, the section concludes with the server module.
3.2.1 Data Collection Module
The most crucial part of the overall privacy sensitive resource monitoring
system is the data collection module. The collection module is responsible
for monitoring sensitive information flow as well as actions taken by each
sensitive resource. The overall data collection module is described in Figure
3.3.
The design of the collection module is composed of two specific imple-
mentation components: TaintDroid [27], and sensitive resource listeners.
TaintDroid is an information-flow tracking system that was originally de-
veloped by Enck et al. [27]. The system automatically labels (taints) data
from privacy-sensitive sources. The specific levels of tracking are variable-
level, method-level, and file-level. As sensitive information flows through
the phone, transitively, the labels are applied and propagated. The current
collection module incorporates TaintDroid by utilizing the TaintDroid log-
ging and tagging system. As shown in Figure 3.3, the colored areas are
modification done by TaintDroid. To support tracking of resource usage
within Android, custom listener components were implemented in applica-
tion framework layer. The specific components in the application frame-
work layer are the implemented resource action listeners. These listeners
track specific actions that could be performed by each sensitive resource.
With the incorporation of the TainDroid system, there are a total of eleven















In Figure 3.3, the components in the application framework layer cor-
responds to the specific listeners needed to track the eleven sources listed.
There are two types of listeners, one that is responsible only for logging
specific actions, and one that is responsible for logging the action as well as
returning data gathered from that action. The listeners are implemented
through the TaintDroid logging system. For only action specific listen-
ers, the resource label and the specific actions are logged in text format.
For example, if a third-party process is using the microphone, the taint tag
“TAINT MIC” will be logged as will as the action “start recording”. For ac-
tion listeners with returning value, the returning value will first be retrieved.
The retrieved value is then logged with the tag information as well as the
action performed.
Figure 3.3, displays all the components that are necessary to track all
the eleven sensitive resources. First, for the location resource, there are
multiple things being tracked. The location listeners are implemented in
two components: location manager and GPS location provider. Table 3.1,
displays the responsible components and various action listeners.
Table 3.1: Location listeners
Sensitive Resources Framework Component Listeners
Location
• Location Manager
• GPS Location Provider
• Location update
• Proximity alert
• Network provider check
• Reporting location
The location update listener listens to third-party requests for location
update as well as request for last known location. This listener simply
records that the specific event occurred. The proximity alert listener listens
to when a proximity request is added or removed. This listener also reports
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the proximity target. The network provider check listener simply checks if
the device has the network provider active. The reporting location listener
listens to when an actual location read occurred. This listener reports the
event and location data: latitude, longitude, altitude, speed, bearing, and
accuracy.
Table 3.2: Contacts listeners
Sensitive Resources Framework Component Listeners
Contacts
• Content Resolver • Contact read
The contact resource is managed by the content resolver component. Ta-
ble 3.2 briefly describes the component and listener. The listener that is
responsible for monitoring contact activity is the contact read listener. This
listener listens queries to contacts. Aside from recording the event, the ac-
cessed column names and the result length is also recorded.
Table 3.3: Microphone listeners




• Audio recorder initializa-
tion
• Audio source and status
For microphone use, there are two components that are responsible for
actions. They are Media Recorder and Audio Record. The audio source and
status listener is attached to the Media Recorder component. This listener
is responsible for recording the event when an audio source is added. This
listener also records the added audio source ID. The audio recorder initial-
ization listener is implemented in Audio Record component. This listener
listens to the microphone initialization event and records the event.
Table 3.4, shows the listeners and components responsible for device
specific resources such as phone number, IMEI, IMSI, and ICCID. The main
component that is responsible is the Telephony Manager. For each resource,
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Table 3.4: Device information listeners
Sensitive Resources Framework Component Listeners
Phone Number




• Reading IMEI number
• Reading IMEI number
complete
IMSI




• Reading ICCID number
• Reading ICCID number
complete
there is a listener attached in the Telephony Manager component to track the
reading event and the resulting accessed value. For IMEI, there is a second
listener attached to the GSM Phone component to track the IMEI reading
completion event. The ICCID reading completion event follows the same
structure as the IMEI reading completion event except that it is implemented
in the SIM Records component.
Another resource that is monitored is the camera. The camera utilizes
the Camera component in the Android framework layer. This is shown in
Table 3.5. There are seven specific listeners attached. The camera initial-
ization listener is attached to record the event when the camera is initialized
by a third-party application. The other listeners track the specific process
that the camera goes through: shutter action, raw image processing, image
compression, preview frame and post view frame. Lastly, the take picture
action listener records the action of physically taking a picture.
For monitoring the accelerometer resource, listeners are attached to the
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Table 3.5: Camera listeners
Sensitive Resources Framework Component Listeners
Camera
• Camera • Camera initialization
• Camera shutter action
• Camera raw image action
• Camera compressed im-
age action
• Camera preview frame ac-
tion
• Camera post view frame
action
• Camera take picture action
Sensor Manager component. Table 3.6 lists the listeners. The main goal
here is to monitor the accelerometer initialization and the register of call-
back listeners. Thus, the initialization listener is attached to the accelerom-
eter initialization process to record the event. For accelerometer, there are
many ways to register listeners; therefore, a separate listener is attached to
each register listener method to listen to all registering events.
Table 3.7, displays the framework components and listeners responsi-
ble for monitoring the SMS resource. The three components involved are
CDMA SMS Dispatcher, GSM SMS Dispatcher, and Content Resolver. In
Table 3.6: Accelerometer listeners
Sensitive Resources Framework Component Listeners
Accelerometer
• Sensor Manager • Accelerometer initializa-
tion
• Registered listener for ac-
celerometer
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Table 3.7: SMS listeners
Sensitive Resources Framework Component Listeners
SMS
• Cdma SMS Dispatcher




CDMA and GSM SMS Dispatcher, the sending SMS listener is attached.
Here, the listener records the event when SMS message were sent out. The
reading SMS listener is attached to the Content Resolver component. This
listener records the query access to the SMS message table. Along with the
event action, the columns queried and the returning length are recorded as
well.
Table 3.8: Browser history listeners
Sensitive Resources Framework Component Listeners
Browser History
• Content Resolver • Reading browser history
The final resource is browser history. This resource is monitored in the
same way as contacts. Table 3.8, shows the specifics. The component in-
volved is Content Resolver. The listener attached is the browser history
reading listener. This listener is attached to the query access for browser
history. Whenever a browser history query is made, the queried columns
and returning length are recorded.
Each of the twelve components in the application framework layer and
their responsible listeners, shown in Figure 3.3, actively integrates with the
already existing TaintDroid system to dynamically and passively monitor
the named eleven sensitive resources. This concludes the design and imple-
mentation discussion for the data collection module. Next, the collection
client module will be discussed.
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3.2.2 Collection Client Module
The collection client module is the component that communicates between
the data collection module and the collection server module. Essentially,
the client module is the messenger. As can be observed in Figure 3.2, the
collection client module resides on the mobile device. This component cap-
tures the listener logs, formats the events, and then sends the formatted data
to the server module. This module is developed as a third-party applica-
tion called TaintDroidNotify. TaintDroidNotify was originally developed
by Ench et al. [27]. Modifications were made to support event formatting
and server communication. This package resides in the application layer of
the Android software stack as seen if Figure 3.3. Specific components and
process flow of the client module is shown in Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: Overall data collection client module design.
For the client module, there are essentially two components. The first
component is the queue. This queue is driven by two active Android ser-
vices. One of the service runs passively in the background to collect all of
the incoming resource access events. The collected events are then inserted
into the queue. The purpose of the queue is to reduce potential bottlenecks
from the formatting process, and to make sure all events are captured. The
second service runs passively in the background as well. This service takes
the logs out of the queue one at a time. Once the logs are taken out, they go
through a data formatting process. This process is done in the data format-
ting component. In the component, information such as application name,
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IP address, taint tag, timestamp, and data messages are fetched. This fetched
information is then put into a key value format. The formatted message is
then sent to the phone device as a notification message or/and sent to the
collection server for storage. An example of the data format and the notifi-
cation message is shown in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Example TaintDroidNotify notification.
The method of communication to collection server module is through
HTTP POST request. This is done though the use of Android HttpClient.
First the HttpClient is initialized. Then a POST request is made to the server
module URL. A name value paired list is then used to store the event data.
After, the name value paired list is added to the POST request. Finally, the
HttpClient attempts the transfer of data by executing the POST request. If
the POST was successful, HttpResponse then receives a success response
message.
In summary, the collection client module enabled passive retrieving and
sending of sensitive resource access events. It allowed the communication
29
between the collection module and the server module to carry on seamlessly.
The next section will discuss the implementation details of the collection
server module.
3.2.3 Collection Server Module
The final component of the privacy sensitive resource monitoring system is
the server module. The server module is responsible for receiving incoming
message strings, processing the message strings, and inserting them into the
database. Figure 3.6, explains the overall server module components and
process flow.
Figure 3.6: Overview of collection server module design and process flow.
There are three main components for the server module as seen in Figure
3.6. The tasks of the server module are to receive HTTP POST requests
and insert them into the database. Thus, an Apache web service had to be
installed to handle incoming HTTP requests. The web service is composed
of the web layer and the application layer. The web layer is the outside
facing interface. All the webpages and actual displays reside in this layer.
Past the web layer is the application layer. The application layer handles the
communication between the web layer and the database. For the purpose of
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this server module, the application layer is written in PHP to interface with
the MySQL database. The application layer establishes connection with the
MySQL database using user and password security checks. This layer also
handles the parsing of incoming POST requests. The POST messages are
formatted to fit into the MySQL database schema. The schema is shown in
Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7: MySQL database schema.
Finally, the schema defines the MySQL database. The schema follows
a very structured layout. There is only one table in the database, since all
income messages are of the same type. There are a total of five columns in
the table. These five columns correspond to the key value structure setup in
the collection client module. The application column stores the application
name of each triggered event. The IP column stores the IP addresses of
the triggered events. The taint column is the column specifying the type of
resources that were accessed. Timestamp column records the exact moment
when the resource event was triggered. Finally, the data column records
extra data passed in by the implemented listeners.
The process flow of this module is a rather simple one. The web layer
receives HTTP POST requests, then the request is passed on to the appli-
cation layer and a response message is sent back to the client module. The
client module checks for valid message body then attempts connection with
the MySQL database. Once a connection is established, the message body
is put into the MySQL schema format and inserted into the specified ta-
ble. Finally, information stored in the MySQL database can be queried and
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analyzed.
This concludes the overall design and implementation of the privacy sen-
sitive resources monitoring system. The next section discusses the test ap-
plication design and final verification against the requirements.
3.3 Test Application Design and Implementation
A test application was created to verify the overall functionality of the sys-
tem. The specific focus of the test application is to mimic third-party appli-
cation processes and test the resource listeners implemented in the Android
application framework layer. The overall design concept is based on the
onClickListener object. For each defined third-party application process, an
onClickListener object is created to trigger that specific action. The result-
ing application that was created is named SensorTrigger, and a screenshot
of the application is shown in Figure 3.8.
Figure 3.8: SensorTrigger application display.
The twelve buttons displayed in Figure 3.8 corresponds to the eleven sen-
sitive resources and their listeners. First, for location resource testing, two
separate onClickListener were created. One was used to test network based
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Table 3.9: Location based resourse test
Sensitive Re-
sources




















location reporting and the other was used to test GPS based location report-
ing. These onClicklisteners trigger separate background location reporting
services. Both services are triggered to be active for twenty-five seconds to
allow their services to complete the location reporting cycle. A complete
match between location resource listeners tested and SensorTrigger actions
performed are displayed in Table 3.9.
Next, for triggering events by contacts, browser history, and SMS related
resources, three separate onClickListeners were created. Table 3.10 displays
the complete match between contacts, browser history, and SMS resource
listeners tested and SensorTrigger actions performed. These triggers are
implemented using the same process. First, request columns are defined.
Then a Cursor object is created to query the specific resource.
The next resource tested was the microphone. For the microphone, an
onClickListener is created to perform the recording action. First, a Me-
diaRecorder object is created. With this MediaRecorder object, the audio
source, output format, output file name, and audio encoder are set. After the
microphone is set to start and record for five seconds. After the five seconds,
the microphone is turned off and the resource is released. Table 3.11, shows
the specific actions performed as well as the listeners tested.
The accelerometer sensor was also incorporated into the resource test.
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Table 3.10: Contacts, browser resource, sms based resourse test
Sensitive Re-
sources




• Contact read • Address
Book
• Read contacts id
and name
Browser His-








• SMS read • SMS • Read SMS id, ad-
dress and body
The implementation of the accelerometer resource triggers follows a simi-
lar structure as the location based trigger implementation. Table 3.12, dis-
plays the accelerometer based resource actions and listeners. For imple-
mentation, first, an onClickListener is created for the accelerometer trig-
ger. Then, a background service is created to perform accelerometer-based
actions. Within the service, SensorManager is created with accelerometer
added as the default sensor. Accelerometer listeners are also registered to
retrieve accelerometer readings.
Table 3.11: Microphone based resource test
Sensitive Re-
sources













Table 3.12: Accelerometer based resource test
Sensitive Re-
sources
















The camera resource test implementation was a little different from the
rest of the resource test implementations. The camera resource test utilizes
the Android intent action. The intent triggers the Camera application on
the Android device. With the triggered Camera application, user has to per-
form the listener-based actions to evaluate the results. Specifically, the user
is required to take a picture using the Camera application on the Android
device. Table 3.13, displays camera resource based listeners and specific
actions taken by the SensorTrigger application.
Finally, for resources such as IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, and phone number,
since they all utilize the same type of resource their trigger implementations
are all similar. They all use the TelephonyManager class, thus a onClick-
Listener and a TelephonyManager object are created for each resource. The
specific tasks performed are simply read access. This is shown in Table
3.14.
The SensorTrigger application is used to trigger all of the implemented
resource listeners. The triggered events are captured by the privacy sensitive
resource monitoring system implemented. The results were then verified in
the database table of the client server module. The SensorTrigger applica-
tion successfully tested the functionality of the overall resource monitoring
system.
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Table 3.13: Camera based resource test
Sensitive Re-
sources





















• Camera • Initialize camera
intent
• Set output file lo-
cation
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Table 3.14: IMEI, IMSI, Phone number, and ICCID based resource test
Sensitive Re-
sources













• IMSI • Read IMSI
Phone Num-












• ICCID • Read ICCID
This concludes the design and implementation of the overall privacy sen-
sitive resource monitoring system as well as the test framework. The over-
all design satisfied all of the requirements previously defined. The imple-
mented resource listeners in the application framework enabled the moni-
toring of communication between available privacy sensitive resources and
other third-party applications. The combined integration of TaintDroid and
active resource listeners allowed sensitive resources to be tracked through-
out the mobile device. The utilization of the Android background service in
the collection client module allowed the system to retrieve TaintDroid log
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information passively without interfering with currently running applica-
tions. Finally, the addition of the collection server module and the database
setup gave the system the flexibility to scale and expand. The next chapter




The privacy sensitive resource access monitoring for Android systems is a
dynamic resource action listening system. The system is capable of identi-
fying and observing direct accesses of third-party applications to sensitive
resources on the phone. The recorded events are composed of name of
source application, type of resource being accessed, IP address if the ac-
cessed information was sent out, a timestamp of when the resource was
accessed, and finally a message body of the specific recorded action.
Relative to the original problem statement: Given the need and benefits
of background services accessing mobile resources, there are both security
and privacy risks. The primary motivation behind the implementation of
the overall system and data collection is to demonstrate some interesting
application behaviors and the potential usage of the application behavior
data collection process. Specifically, application behaviors will be observed
through the analysis of sensitive resource utilization, access intensity, and
sequence based analysis. Potential usage of the interesting findings will
also be discussed. This section will start with experiment setup followed by
analysis of results.
4.1 Experiment Setup
The overall privacy sensitive resource monitoring for Android system is im-
plemented in Android 4.3 release 1 stock ROM (Read-only Memory). Later,
the finished ROM is installed and tested on a Nexus 4. The installed appli-
cations and their categories are shown in Table 4.1. There are a total of
forty-seven third-party applications installed.
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Table 4.1: Categories and applications downloaded.
Categories Applications
Tools Flashlight, Compass, DigiHUD, Location, my Location, PowerTutor,
Shazam, SmartVoice Recorder, TalkBack, Uber
Games 2048 Puzzle, Basketball Throw, Wordsearch
Productivity Adobe AIR, Duolingo, Google Text-to-speech Engine, Google Voice,
Job Search, Quickoffice, SpeechToText Notepad, Zillow
Books Bible, Guess the Emoji Answers, Manga, Manga Rock
Finances BofA, Chase, Square Register
News BuzzFeed, CNN , FIFA
Shopping Cartwheel
Entertainment Change My Voice, Pandora, Rising Start, Spotify
Social Facebook, LINE, PicsArt, Snapchat, Twitter
Health iTriage, MyFitnessPal, Running, SleepBot
Personalization Kitty Play
Weather The Weather Channel
The idea behind picking the applications shown in Table 4.1 is to observe
as many types of applications as possible. The applications downloaded are
all popular applications in each of their categories displayed. The hope
is that different types of applications behave in a different ways. After
the applications were installed, two different data collection process were
performed. The two different data collection processes were passive data
collection and active data collection. The idea was to observe behavioral
differences of third-party application in a passive environment as well as
an active environment. The later subsections discuss the collection process
setup for collecting both passive and active data.
4.1.1 Passive Data Collection
The motivation behind passive data collection is to observe third-party ap-
plication behaviors in an environment without user interaction. This is to
spectate and identify typical behaviors of third-party applications. The envi-
ronment setup for this type of collection was simple. A four hour time frame
window was chosen. The time frame window size was chosen based on ob-
servations of passive data throughout the day. From observation, it was con-
cluded that third-party applications behave in the same way throughout the
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day. Thus, the four hour time frame chosen to provide a sufficient amount
of data for analysis as well as capture the essential behavior of third-party
applications in a passive mode.
With the chosen time frame, the following steps were taken to initiate the
collection process:
1. Turned on the Nexus 4 device with installed applications and im-
plemented data collection system
2. Started TaintDroidNotify application to enable the collection pro-
cess
3. Left the phone without further user interaction for four hours
4. Turned off the TaintDroidNotify application to end the collection
process
The collected data were then examined and observed in the MySQL
database setup. The next subsection will discuss the setup for active data
collection.
4.1.2 Active Data Collection
The active data collection is a bit more complicated than the passive data
collection. The goal of active data collection is to capture third-party ap-
plication behaviors when the user is actively interacting with the mobile
device. The environment setup is to mimic that of a real user in a typical
day. In this experiment, no real human study subjects were used. For the
setup design, there were two main considerations: time window of exper-
imentation and types of activities. First, to make the comparable between
the passive and active data, the time frame window for collection was also
set to be four hours. Secondly, to best mimic a typical user in a four-hour
time frame, a set of specific actions was defined and carried out.
The activities and time spent on each activity were constructed based on
an article written by Ballve [7]. A study done by BI Intelligence discovered
that on average, U.S. smartphone owners spend fifty-eight minutes daily on
their phone. The breakdowns of each activity were also discovered. The
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most intensive activity is talking, which dominated the twenty-eight percent
of the fifty-eight minutes. The rest of the activities are as follows: texting
(twenty-one percent), social networking (seventeen percent), web browsing
(fifteen percent), gaming (nine percent) and others (ten percent) [7].
In order to mimic the behavior of a typical user in a four-hour time frame,
the fifty-eight minutes used by an average user in a day had to be further
divided. Intuitively speaking, out of twenty-four hour period, on average,
eight hours are spent sleeping and the other eight hours are allocated to
working. Essentially, most of the fifty-eight minutes spent on the phone by
an average user would be spent in an eight-hour time window. The exact
breakdowns of time spent on each activity is shown in Table 4.2.
The activities performed and the duration of time for this experiment are
so follows:
1. Turned on the Nexus 4 device with installed applications and im-
plemented data collection system
2. Started TaintDroidNotify application to enable the collection pro-
cess
3. Four minutes (passive)
4. Used LINE application to text
5. Browsed the internet for two minutes and sent two texts
6. Eight minutes (passive)
7. Checked Facebook for five minutes and sent two texts
8. Eighteen minutes (passive)
9. Played Basketball Throw for five minutes and sent two texts
10. Nine minutes (passive)
11. Sent one text
12. Thirty two minutes (passive)
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13. Read CNN for two minutes and sent two texts
14. Eight minutes (passive)
15. Checked Twitter for one minute and sent one text
16. Thirty four minutes (passive)
17. Browsed for two minutes and sent two texts
18. Seven minutes (passive)
19. Checked Twitter for two minutes and sent two texts
20. Fifty-four minutes (passive)
21. Checked Twitter for one minute and sent one text
22. Forty-seven minutes (passive)
23. Turned off the TaintDroidNotify application to end the collection
process
Table 4.2: User interaction activity time breakdown.
Activity Type Utilization Percent-
age
Utilization Minutes Actual Minutes
Talk 28 16.8 0
Text 21 12.6 9
Social 17 10.2 9
Web Browsing 15 9 4
Games 9 5.4 5
Other 10 6 2
The utilization percentage column is the specific percentage breakdown
gathered from the study done by BI Intelligence [7]. The utilization min-
utes column describes the actual minutes a typical user would have spent
in a day. The derived minutes are based on the utilization percentage in
an hour. The actual minutes column shows the exact amount of time spent
for each activity for the purpose of this case study. The phone used for the
purpose of this experiment did not have a mobile service provider, thus the
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talking activity could not be performed. Also, this experimental setup is
only simulating one particular use case of a typical smartphone user; by no
means does it represent all of the average smartphone users.
This concludes the experiment setup section. The next section discusses
interesting findings and results of this data collection process.
4.2 Results
The collected results are analyzed based on three categories: resource uti-
lization, resource access intensity, and activity based sequential analysis.
Specifically, the passive data collected are analyzed and compared to the
active data. Interesting behaviors and discoveries are discussed in this sec-
tion.
4.2.1 Privacy Sensitive Resource Utilization
The motivation behind sensitive resource utilization observation is to profile
each individual third-party application process and/or the category of appli-
cation in terms of access volume and accessed resource. In terms of privacy
sensitive resource utilization, third-party application process access levels
and categories of third-party application process access levels, as well as re-
source access levels are analyzed. These analyses were run on both passive
and active data collected.
Figure 4.1, is a display of resource access attempts made by third-party
applications in a passive mode. The x-axis shows the active applications
that attempted sensitive resource access. The y-axis marks the number of
attempts made in the four-hour period. As it can be observed from the
figure, the Weather Channel application followed by Android system pro-
cesses dominates passive resource activities. In the four-hour span, 234
sensitive resource accesses were made by the Weather Channel application.
Then, the total resource access record was followed by Facebook applica-
tion and Google Play processes. Applications that utilize the least amount
of resources are Sleepbot, Pandora, Nike Plus, FIFA, Buzzfeed, and Google
Quicksearch.
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Figure 4.1: Number of sensitive resource accesses made by each third-party application
passively.
On the other hand, Figure 4.2 displays the resource access attempts made
by third-party applications in a active mode. The figure is displayed in the
same format as Figure 4.1. As can be observed in Figure 4.2, the total num-
ber of resource accesses is dominated by the Weather Channel application.
Applications like Facebook, Twitter, Google services, and Android system
processes follow right after. Applications with the least amount of utiliza-
tion are: Keyboard, Phone, FIFA, Sleepbot, Nike Plus, Pandora, and LINE.
One interesting observation in the active case is that, numerous third-party
applications have separate process names for different services being car-
ried out. For example, Twitter has two different processes shown in Figure
4.2. One of the process is named com.twitter.android and the other is named
com.twitter.android:MediaService.
Overall, comparing the application access graphs of the passive and ac-
tive case, many observation can be made. In the active case, Figure 4.2, the
volume of activity and number of third-party applications are more than that
of the passive case. Thus, it could be concluded that third-party applications
are partially driven by user interaction. By observing the passive case, Fig-
ure 4.1, it could be also concluded that third-party applications tend to have
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Figure 4.2: Number of sensitive resource accesses made by each third-party application
actively.
processes that run in the background even when the application was never
initiated in the foreground. In summary, the volume and number of third-
party application processes are partly driven by user interaction and partly
driven by the applications themselves.
To observe the correlation between the category of applications and the
number of resource access attemps, the third-party applications found in
Figure 4.1 and 4.2 are classified into different categories. The categoriza-
tion is mainly based on Table 4.1. The identified categories are Android, en-
tertainment, Google, lifestyle, news, references, social and weather. Some
of the categories such as Android and Google are categorized based on the
different processes collected since there are no specific applications down-
loaded for them.
Figure 4.3 shows the number of sensitive resource passive access at-
tempts achieved by each defined category. The x-axis displays the defined
categories, and the y-axis displays the number of resource access attempts.
It could be observed that the weather category has the most resource access
attempts. The Android category follows. Application categories that uti-
lize the least amount of sensitive resources in the passive mode are news,
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Figure 4.3: Number of sensitive resource accesses made by different categories of third-
party application passively.
lifestyle, and entertainment.
For the active case the number of sensitive resource access attempts
achieved by each defined category was shown in Figure 4.4. The graph
layout is the same structure as Figure 4.3. In Figure 4.4, the weather and
Google categories dominates the graph followed by social and Android cat-
egories. The minimum sensitive resources accessed in the active mode is
the entertainment category.
Comparing both the passive and active case, in Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the
difference seem to be the number of resource access attempts. Like resource
access attempts by each individual third-party application, the resource ac-
cess attempts achieved by different categories of applications are also driven
by user interaction. The more a certain type of third-party application was
interacted, the higher resource access attempt counts will be. By comparing
the passive and active case, an understanding of the type of user interac-
tion can be defined. For example, the extreme increase in categories such
as Google and social lead to the inference that during that time frame the
user has interacted with many social applications as well as Google services
related application. This is validated by observing Table 4.2. The type of
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Figure 4.4: Number of sensitive resource accesses made by different categories of third-
party application actively.
activity with the most minutes spent is social, thus, the extreme increase in
resource access attempts in the social category makes sense.
Figure 4.5, shows the passive access count attempts in terms of resources
utilized. The x-axis shows the type of sensitive resources accessed, and y-
axis shows the number of access attempts made. The color scheme cor-
responds to the categories of applications previously defined. Location,
address book, and GPS location are resources that are being utilized the
most. Most of the location, address book and GPS location resources access
attempts are made by application categories such as weather, social and
Google. Device identification related resources seem to be accessed a mod-
erate amount as well. Applications in the Google and reference categories
seem to utilize device identification related resources the most.
For the active case, the access count attempts in terms of resources uti-
lized are shown in Figure 4.6. Like Figure 4.5, the x-axis shows the type
of sensitive resources accessed, and y-axis shows the number of access at-
tempts made. The most utilized resources are location, address book and
GPS location. One interesting observation is that third-party applications
tend to access location, address book, and GPS location all at once. For that
48
Figure 4.5: Passive utilization of types of resources in terms of categories of third-party
application processes.
specific column, all categories of resources utilized it.
Figure 4.6: Passive utilization of types of resources in terms of categories of third-party
application processes.
Comparing the passive and active case of access count attempts in terms
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of resources used, application usage drives the type of resources accessed.
In the active set, there are a total of four resource groups added. The actively
triggered resources are: browser history, camera, microphone input, and
phone number. The type of user activity triggered during the experiment
drives these extra resources.
Overall, it can be concluded that user interactions drive the type and vol-
ume of resource access attempts. This is demonstrated through resources
access counts in terms of third-party application processes, categories, and
resources. The resources being accessed do not necessarily belong to a spe-
cific type of applications; however, there are special cases where a certain
type of application only access specific resources. The Weather Channel ap-
plication is an example. This resource utilization analysis could be used to
profile categories of applications. The comparison of passive and active data
can also be used to determine user actions. The next subsection discusses
intensity in terms of sensitive resource access.
4.2.2 Privacy Sensitive Resource Access Intensity
This section examines the resource access intensity of different categories
of applications. The analysis first observes the heat map of resource access
intensity in the passive and active case. Then, the analysis is followed by
a comparison of total, application, and resource access intensity. Next, the
access intensity of each application category is then graphed to observe pat-
terns and behaviors. Finally, specific cases of the impact of user-interaction
to access intensity are observed.
Figure 4.7 displays the passive access intensity of applications and their
utilized resources in a heat map format. The left column displays the cate-
gories of applications. The first row shows the type of sensitive resources
accessed. The number of access attempts made in a four-hour period de-
termines the intensity. The weather category is the most access intensive,
then followed by Android, Google, and social applications. Application
categories such as Android, Google, and references tend to access multiple
resources, however, with minimum intensity for each resources accessed.
The most intensively accessed resource is location-based resource.
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Figure 4.7: Intensity heat map of passive resource access attempts.
Figure 4.8: Intensity heat map of active resource access attempts.
Like the passive case, Figure 4.8 shows the active access intensity of
applications and their utilized resources. In the active case, most of the
activity seems to hover around location and address book access. The cat-
egories with high intensity access are Google, social and weather. The rest
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of the access intensities are pretty spread due to the type of activity that was
performed during the experiment.
Comparing the passive and active case, there are many differences. With
each triggered activity, there is an increase accessed resource type. For ex-
ample, social category in the passive case accessed only location, address
book, and GPS. In the active case, resources such as camera, IMEI, micro-
phone, and phone number are all resources accessed in addition. The heat
map of the active case has a more spread-out look and dominated by multi-
ple high intensity areas. In summary, user induced actions drive the type of
resources accessed and the access intensity.
Figure 4.9 displays the passive intensity comparison of total access, ap-
plication category access, and resource access over times. The y-axis shows
the number of access attempts. The x-axis is the time line of the exper-
iment. The top, middle, and bottom graphs display the total application
access intensity; application categories access intensity, and resource access
intensity overtime respectively. For all three graphs, there is an initial sort of
access, and this is due to the initial startup of the Android system. Overtime,
that extreme intensity dies down and peaks again periodically. The periodic
peaks are mainly driven by the weather application acquiring location-based
access.
For the active case, the intensity comparison is displayed in Figure 4.10.
Here, sharp peaks that occur randomly characterize the behaviors of differ-
ent access intensities overtime. The randomness is mainly driven by user
interaction at that specific moment. Categories with extreme high peaks are
Google and social. The types of resources that seem to be accessed dur-
ing those times are address book, location, and GPS. In summary, the exact
moment of user interaction determines the access intensity of application
category as well as resource accessed.
Figure 4.11 is an expanded view of the access intensity of each applica-
tion category. The y-axis shows the categories, and the x-axis displays the
time. Categories such as entertainment, lifestyle, and news behave in the
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Figure 4.9: Intensity summary graph of passive resource access attempts.
Figure 4.10: Intensity summary graph of active resource access attempts.
same way. These categories have single point access intensity. Google cate-
gory behaves with an initial drop. The access intensity of Google drops dra-
matically from initialization then flat lines with minor activities. More con-
tinuous access intensity is exhibited by categories such as social, weather,
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and Android. Periodic peaks characterize them. The reference category
seems to have an obscure behavior. This would require further analysis.
Figure 4.11: Intensity of passive resource access attempts by application categories.
Figure 4.12: Intensity of active resource access attempts by application categories.
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The active case of the access intensity by application categories is dis-
played in Figure 4.12. In the active case, categories such as entertainment,
lifestyle, news, and reference behave the same way. For them, there are
periodic sensitive resource access attempts when the application is not run-
ning in the foreground. These periodic sensitive resource access attempts
are then followed by extreme peaks recording an event where the user has
actively interacted with these applications. Application categories such as
Android, Google, and social behave in another way. These categories are
characterized by small continuous resource access attempts followed by ex-
treme peaks signaling user interaction. Lastly, the weather category graph
resembles a zigzag line. It is characterized by close high resource access in-
tensity followed by low resource access intensity. Overall, the active case is
driven by user interaction, and it builds on the intensity of the passive case.
Figure 4.13: Intensity comparison between specific passive and active application cate-
gories.
Figure 4.13 details specific passive and active application categories. The
y-axis is the number of access attempts, and the x-axis is the time. The
chosen application categories are entertainment, lifestyle, news, reference,
and social. The top graph displays their behavior in the passive case, and
the bottom graph displays their behavior in the active case. Each activity
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performed, they were also marked on the active graph. As seen on the graph,
user interactions have a correlation with sensitive resource access intensity.
Throughout intensity analysis, there are a few things that can be ob-
served. First, each application category has its access intensity behavior.
This access intensity behavior differs between the passive and active case.
They differ in the sense that, the active access intensity builds on existing
passive access intensity model. Finally, much like resource utilization, the
access intensity level is also driven by user interaction.
4.2.3 Network Traffic Analysis
Aside from sensitive resource utilization and access intensity analysis, the
data collected also enable network traffic analysis in terms of application,
application categories, and resources. This section discusses the outbound
network traffic that contains sensitive information.
Figure 4.14: Passive application network traffic.
Figure 4.14 displays the passive application network traffic. The y-axis
shows the number of resource access attempts, and the x-axis displays the
names of applications. The color scheme displays application network traf-
fic. Red color represents the out flow of network traffic, and blue represents
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Figure 4.15: Active application network traffic.
internal resource access. As could be observed, most resources have both
internal and external activity. However, Facebook and Twitter seem to have
only outbound traffic. Facebook is the most outbound intensive application.
The active case is displayed in Figure 4.15. With user interaction, there
is an increase in outbound network traffic. For the most part applications
have both internal and external traffic. Applications such as Facebook and
Twitter that did not have an internal traffic shown in Figure 4.14, now have
both internal and external traffic shown.
In terms of application category, the graphs summarize the network traf-
fic of each individual application. The passive category analysis is displayed
in Figure 4.16. The most outbound traffic intensive application category is
social, where one hundred percent of the resource activities were outbound
traffic. On the other hand, weather and Android application categories are
mostly dominated by internal activities.
For the active case, the results are displayed in Figure 4.17. From the
figure, it is observed that there is an increase in outbound traffic as well
as internal activity for each application category. Google category seems
to have a balanced internal and external traffic. All other user triggered
activity categories seem to have an extreme increase in outbound traffic. For
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example, the news category changed from two in the passive case to seventy-
eight in the active case. Definitely, the type of user action is positively
related to outbound network traffic activity.
Figure 4.16: Passive application network traffic in terms of application categories
Figure 4.17: Active application network traffic in terms of application categories.
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Aside from network traffic analysis based on application categories, Fig-
ure 4.18 shows the passive network traffic behavior in terms of utilized re-
sources. The y-axis shows the number of sensitive resource access attempts,
and the x-axis shows the type of utilized resource. It is very clear from the
graph that location, address book, GPS resource combination has the most
outbound traffic. location, address book, GPS, and IMEI combination has
the second highest outbound traffic. In the passive mode, most utilized re-
sources are for internal purposes, and kept internal.
Figure 4.18: Passive application network traffic in terms of utilized resources.
Figure 4.23 shows the active application network traffic in terms of uti-
lized resources. Very much like the passive case, resource combination such
as location, address book, and GPS dominate outbound traffic. However,
with specific user activity, there is an increase in outbound traffic for ad-
dress book. Also, resources such as IMEI that did not have outbound traffic
is now shown with activities. Overall, the outbound traffic intensity and type
of sensitive resource depends on the type of action performed by the user.
Besides the traffic volume, Table 4.3 displays the unique findings in
terms of IP addresses. It is observed, for each application, there are mul-
tiple IP addresses assigned. For example, mangarock has a total of eleven
IP addresses assigned for outbound traffic in the passive case. However,
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Figure 4.19: Active application network traffic in terms of utilized resources.
with an increase in user activity, there is an increase in number of unique IP
addresses. As shown in the passive and active IP address count columns, the
number of unique IP addresses increased. Facebook application increased
from five IP addresses in the passive case to twelve IP addresses in the ac-
tive case. Some applications such as Zillow went from no external network
activity to nine unique IP addresses in the active case.
After looking at the unique IP addresses and the applications sending
to those IP addresses, it was quickly observed that there are certain IP ad-
dresses that are used by different applications. The interesting findings are
shown in Table 4.4. The IP address column displays the unique IP addresses.
The purpose column displays the owner of the IP address and the location
of it. The application column displays the applications that are utilizing that
specific address. For example, Buzzfeed and Facebook utilized the same IP
address. Since the used IP address is assigned to Facebook, it seems like the
application Buzzfeed is also sending information to Facebook. This might
suggest collaboration between Facebook and Buzzfeed.
Overall, there are a few things that could be summarized about network
traffic. First, outbound network traffic usually carry location, address book,
and IMEI information. The volume and type of outbound network traffic
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Table 4.3: Number of IP address for each application in the passive and active case.






google gapps 6 7
google gm - 2
google gms 1 6
google gms maps - 1
google gsf login - 2
google play 1 19
google quick search 2 4
googlevoice - 2
mangarock 11 15
nike plus gps - 3






twitter MediaService - 1
weather 11 29
zillow - 9
Table 4.4: Applications with same IP addresses.
IP Address Purpose Application
IP 1 Akamai Technologies (Cambridge, Mas-
sachusetts)
FIFA, Nike Plus GPS
IP 2 Google Inc. (Mountain View, California) Google gms, Google Voice
IP 3 Facebook (Palo Alto, California) Buzzfeed, Facebook
IP 4 Google Inc. (Mountain View, California) Google gms maps, Zillow
IP 5 Amazon AWS (Seattle Washington) Buzzfeed, Mangarock
IP 6 Amazon AWS (Ashburn, Virginia) Pandora, Sleepbot
is usually driven by user interaction. Each installed third-party application
utilizes multiple unique IP addresses, and with increase in user activity, the
61
number of unique IP addresses increase as well. Finally, there are also spe-
cial cases, where the same IP addresses are used by different applications.
This behavior might suggest collaboration between third-party applications
outside the mobile device. The next section discusses action based sequen-
tial analysis.
4.2.4 Action Based Sequential Analysis
The data collected also provide insights into typical behaviors of specific
actions taken. The collected data were first sectioned off by the application
name. Then, depending of the timestamps for each data entry the resource
type of recorded data were analyzed to observe repeating pattern. Specifi-
cally, the Google location process, Snapchat process, and the Weather Chan-
nel processes were carefully observed and analyzed.
For analyzing the Google location process, it is observed that the process
behaves differently from the passive and active modes. Figure 4.20 displays
the passive mode sequence of Google location process. Initially, the ac-
celerometer sensor is added. After, the process checks for passive network
provider as well as mobile network provider. Then, location update requests
are made with a looper. The looper handles massage loop responses. This
cycle continues every now and then throughout the passive mode.
Figure 4.20: Passive action sequence of Google location process.
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For the active Google location process sequence, the behavior can be
seen in Figure 4.21. At first glance, the active cycle sequence looks like it
adapts the already existing passive sequence. First, accelerometer is added,
then network providers are checked, and location update request is made
with a callback looper. The additional cycle actions are checking for GPS
provider and finally registering an accelerometer with a callback handler.
This is a typical cycle sequence of actions for Google location process in
the active mode.
Figure 4.21: Active action sequence of Google location process.
Through the observation of both the passive and active behavior of Google
location process, there is one interesting observation. In normal cases, pro-
cesses active behaviors tend to build on the behaviors of the processes in the
passive case.
Another application action analyzed is the Snapchat process. The se-
quence observed is displayed in Figure 4.22. The specific user action taken
was first start Snapchat, take a picture, and send off the picture taken to a
friend. The actual results collected show the sequence of sensitive resources
accessed. First, the device IMEI number is obtained, and then depending on
the user, the front or back camera is accessed. After, the phone number of
the device is also collected. When a picture is taken, the camera preview
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resource is used, and the camcorder is registered. Finally, the picture is sent
out using an external IP address.
Figure 4.22: Action sequence of using Snapchat.
Aside from the analyzed sequence, the outbound data were analyzed as
well. In the Snapchat case, the outbound data consisted of information such
as user ID, device information, photo ID, screenshot count, and timestamp.
Most of the information seems to be critical for application development
and business analysis.
Figure 4.23: Action sequence of the Weather Channel application.
The last analyzed application is the Weather Channel. The resulted se-
quence is shown in Figure 4.23. For the sequence, the Weather Channel ap-
plication utilized the location resource first by checking available network
accesses. In this case, the application checks for hybrid network provider
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followed by mobile network provider and GPS provider. Once a provider is
verified, the process requests for location update with a callback intent reg-
istered. After, the process gets last known location and sends the acquired
location to an external IP address. This sequence process is very consistent
throughout both the passive and active modes. The location information sent
out is usually just the coordinates obtained from the get last known location
step.
Overall, the specific action cases discussed in this section demonstrate
the capability of sequential action profiling for user actions from the data
collected. There are three main observation made from the analysis. First,
active resource access sequences tend to build on that of the passive se-
quence. Secondly, for location based resource accesses, network provider
checking seems to be a priority. The sequence of network provider check-
ing is as follows: hybrid, network, and GPS. Finally, through observation
of the actual outbound data, it is shown that most outbound data contain
application specific information that is crucial for application development
and business analysis.
4.3 Performance
The original designe of the system was for the purpose of collecting com-
munication information between third-party applications and available re-
sources. This is an initial work in this area, thus, not much performance
emphasis was given for the overall system. The performance analysis that
was evaluated was based on data usage and power consumption. Table 4.5,
shows the data and battery usage evaluation.
Measures Time Frame Stock ROM Panorama Expected Usage Per Recording
Data Usage 24 hours 13MB 21MB 0.006MB
Battery Power 6 hours 11 percent 18 percent 0.021 percent
Table 4.5: Performance measures of Panorama.
In terms of data usage, a user can expect an 8MB increase every day. For
power consuption, a user should expect a 7 percent increase for every six
hours. This presents an opportunity for future improvement in this area.
65
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
Data is, now more than ever, becoming a driving force behind technology
developments as well as business progression. With the increase in market
growth for smartphone devices, and the increase human dependency on their
smartphone devices, mobile data is becoming a crucial piece of information
for various aspects of analysis. There are cases, where mobile data has been
used to understand human communication patterns [21], social relationships
[8], and etc. However, there are few researches that focused on analyzing
the behavior of applications that are installed on the device.
Given the need and benefits of background services accessing mobile re-
sources, users often have little understanding of the leakage of security and
privacy information. To address these risks, datasets should be collected
relating to activities of background services accessing privacy sensitive mo-
bile resources. There are also many challenges involved with this type of
data collection. The first challenge is the Android security structure. The
sandbox structure prevents the monitoring of other third-party applications.
The second challenge is identifying and actually recording privacy sensitive
mobile resources access events. The third challenge is that the collection
process must seamlessly work in parallel with the Android system.
With the challenges defined, the resulted system designed is a three com-
ponent privacy sensitive resource access monitoring for Android system.
The sandbox security structure challenge was mitigated by designing a col-
lection mechanism that modified the framework layer of the Android soft-
ware stack and incorporated the TaintDroid sensitive information flow track-
ing system. The recording of resource access challenge was overcome by
implementing resource specific action listeners through the utilization of
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the TaintDroid logging system. Finally, the seamless architecture challenge
was overcome by embedding the listeners in each of the sensitive resource
components. By embedding the listeners in sensitive resource components,
third-party applications do not require any additional implementation for
sensitive resource accesses to be captured. Here are some of the highlights
of the system:
• Enabled dynamic monitoring and collection of sensitive resource
activity
• Provided modular framework for easy modification
• Provided understanding of third-party application behavior in pas-
sive and active case
• Enabled sequential analysis of specific third-party application
Overall, the system enabled dynamic monitoring and collection of sensitive
resource activities. It also provided a modular framework for easy modifi-
cation in the future.
The data collected as a result of the overall system provided insights
into the behaviors of third-party application. The privacy sensitive resource
utilization analysis showed that third-party applications do utilize sensitive
resources passively. It also showed that location based resource is the most
utilized sensitive resource. In the intensity analysis, it is discovered that
each activity type has its access intensity behavior. Also, each active sensi-
tive resource access intensity builds on its existing passive sensitive resource
access intensity model. In the network traffic case, outbound traffic were
usually composed of location, address book, and IMEI based information.
Another interesting finding is that there are many third-party applications
that actually utilize the same IP address. Lastly, in the action based sequen-
tial analysis, it was discovered that certain accessed resource follow a typ-
ical access sequence. For example, for location-based resource, the access
sequence is usually checking for hybrid provider, then network provider,
and finally GPS provider.
The analyzed results provided insights into third-party applications and
sensitive resources that were often overlooked. However, there are many
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limitations with this data collection tool. Due to the placement of some
of the sensitive resource access listeners, it is very difficult to determine
the application that initiated the action. For example, the camera resource
does not register the initiated third-party application. Another limitation is
on the number of sensitive resource monitored. This overall system was
designed to demonstrate the capability of the collection mechanism; it does
not monitor all the sensitive resources on the mobile device.
As for future work there are many things that could be done in three spe-
cific areas. For the collection module, more listeners could be implemented
to increase the data sample size. During the collection process, relating the
current process and initiated process can also help monitor application-to-
application communication. For the server module, a graphical web inter-
face could be created to display the data collected. Further, for data mining
efficiency, multiple data tables could be created to represent each monitored
application. Lastly, for analysis, the experiment could be tested on multiple
devices to observe cross device behavior. Also, this tool could be used to
observe application sequential behavior and compare that to static applica-
tion sequential behavior analysis. Finally, machine learning could be used
on the data collected to train devices to identify what is normal and what
is abnormal process/resource behavior. Overall, this is a small step in con-
tributing datasets and presenting creative ways that the datasets could be
used to solve real world problems.
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